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Securing Whiteness?  
 
Critical Race Theory (CRT) and the securitization of Muslims 
in Education  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article revisits Critical Race Theory and brings it’s explanatory capacity to 
bear on the contemporary racialization of Muslims in Europe, most specifically the 
experience of British Muslim communities in education. The article argues that CRT 
can provide a theoretically fruitful means of gauging the ways in which anti-Muslim 
discrimination might be engendered through various strategies around 
securitization. In a social and political context characterized by a hyper-vigilance of 
Muslim educators in particular, the article concludes that applying CRT allows us to 
explore how a general latent whiteness is given political content through a particular 
racialization of Muslims. 
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Introduction 
 
‘While this appears to be an attack on a particular community, like the terrible 
attacks in Manchester, Westminster and London Bridge it is also an assault on all our 
shared values of tolerance, freedom and respect.’i So stated London Mayor Sadiq 
Khan in the aftermath to the terrorist attack by a white nationalist on Finsbury Park 
Mosque. That it needs to be specified that the safety and security of Muslim Britons 
is coterminous with the safety and security of non-Muslim Britons, suggests that 
something is out of kilter with how we have come to approach the topic of security. 
Indeed, and while there is now a critically compelling literature on the role and 
function of recent approaches to security in Britain (Holmwood and O’Toole, 2017; 
O’Toole and Meer et al., 2016; Jackson, 2015; Husband and Alam, 2011; Kundani, 
2009), the policy approach has remained strikingly asymmetrical in focusing upon 
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the safety and security of the white majority, and what Muslim communities can 
better do to ensure this. This is despite the evidence that Muslims too are the victims 
of terrorism in the UK, whomever it is perpetrated by (Ismail, 2017).    
 
In this article we seek to advance a conceptual discussion of this topic, specifically 
bringing to bear literatures from Critical Race Theory (CRT) to show how our 
understanding of the securitisation of Muslims would benefit from better 
foregrounding the role and function of whiteness. It is argued that re-visiting and 
utilising CRT can encourage us to think about the ways in which ‘security’ in Britain 
has become encoded in notions of civic participation and national belonging, which 
are in turn anchored in repertoires of whiteness. The article illustrates this by 
examining the policy debates about ‘Fundamental British Values’ and the ‘Trojan 
Horse letter’. Each example, it is argued, illustrates how majoritarian codes are 
crafting strategies that in effect police Muslim mobilisations and claims-making, most 
apparently in our cases in the field of education. Whose security is being elevated, 
we suggest, flows from priorities forged in latent assumptions of whiteness. 
 
Critical Race Theory and Whiteness 
 
The provenance of Critical Race Theory may be traced to American legal 
discourse, in terms of ‘a counter-legal scholarship to the positivist and liberal legal 
discourse of civil rights’ (Ladson-Billings 1998: 7), and so foregrounds a concern with 
the historical, political and socio-economic position of African Americans relative to 
white American society. Relationality to whiteness, therefore, has always been central 
to CRT approaches, and specifically how this relationship is contoured by questions 
of ‘race’ and power. This is not intended as a benign description. The cornerstone 
of CRT approaches has been that ‘racism is normal, not aberrant, in American 
society’ (Delgado 1995, xiv). The ‘normalisation’ here, in Delgado’s (1995, xiv) classic 
text Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, casts racism as having formed ‘an 
ingrained feature of our landscape, [where] it looks ordinary and natural to persons 
in the culture.’ He continued:  
 
Formal equal opportunity rules and laws that insist on treating Blacks and whites 
(for example) alike, can thus remedy only the more extreme and shocking sorts 
of injustice… Formal equality can do little about the business-as-usual forms of 
racism that people of color confront every day and that account for much 
misery, alienation, and despair.  
 
Perhaps an under-recognised feature of this process, is the notion of a wider social 
desensitization to racism; possibly signalled in Delgado’s description of racism as 
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‘business as usual’.  A similar set of social processes are arguably characterised by 
other authors in their discussion of ‘everyday racism’ (Essed, 1991) and the subjective 
negotiation of this. What we maintain is presently overlooked relates to how 
‘desensitisation’ in turn increases the thresholds for what constitutes ‘real’ racism. 
This is perhaps what Goldberg (2006: 339) gestures to as the phenomenology of 
‘race’ disappearing ‘into the seams of sociality, invisibly holding the social fabric 
together even as it tears apart’.  While policies promoting anti-racism continue to 
exist in society, they become focused on addressing unambiguous forms of racism, 
which incrementally normalises what ought to be considered extreme. So running 
parallel to observations about desensitisation, CRT scholars have long been 
interested in the nature and function of ‘smokescreens’ so called.   
 
There are perhaps conceptual and empirical gaps here, and the CRT literature 
struggles with the more ambivalent mechanics of racialization, for much of the CRT 
literature works with a broad brush in typically centring on the ways racial justice is 
'embraced in the American mainstream in terms that excluded radical and 
fundamental challenges to status quo institutional practices' (Crenshaw et al 1995, 
xiv). This is understandable since CRT scholars do not have to work hard to elaborate 
how the US was founded in ways that relied on treating Black African slaves as 
property, and then formally emancipated African-Americans as socially, politically 
and legally lesser to whites (Ladson-Billings 1998: 15). American CRT theorists have 
been enmeshed in these debates and commenced with the implications of these 
historical relationships, before advancing the more normative position that a failure 
to question and acknowledge the function of racism is synonymous with acting to 
maintain the marginalised position of racialised minorities (Preston and Chadderton 
2012).  Much of this turns on the conviction that both tangible and intangible forms 
of racism are the principal means through which whiteness continues to be 
privileged.  
 
Before we elaborate why this focus is useful in understanding the codification of 
security in Britain, specifically in terms of relationality to whiteness, it is important to 
register the divergences in thinking about whiteness.  These correspond to its study 
from contexts marked by historical segregation (e.g. the US and South Africa) and 
elsewhere that whiteness has either (i) functioned (at least formally) as a banal 
repository of white majority conceptions of the given identity of societies, or (ii) 
ordered social relations in colonial states occupied overseas. What each reading 
shares in common, however, is that while whiteness was once ‘seen as both invisible 
and normative, as being a state of ‘racelessness’, this is increasingly recognised only 
as appearing to be the case’ (Rhodes, 2013: 52).  
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This paper is principally interested in the first kind, and proceeds with the distinction 
between whiteness and white individuals that has been usefully elaborated in well-
known arguments by Bonnett (1997) and Leonardo (2002) respectively. For the 
latter, ‘whilst whiteness represents a racial discourse, the category of white people 
represents a socially constructed identity usually based on skin colour’ (Leonardo 
2002: 31).  Bonnett (1997: 189) meanwhile highlights both the distinction and 
relationship between white people and whiteness further, while Gillborn (2005) draws 
on Bonnett’s argument to argue it is not necessarily the case that white people as 
individuals inevitably reinforce whiteness any more than heterosexuals are 
necessarily homophobic or men are necessarily sexist.  The likelihood however is that 
most homophobic individuals are heterosexual, and most sexist discrimination 
occurs against women. This point is simply that whiteness as a racial discourse does 
not necessarily require white people to act in the interests of reinforcing whiteness. 
Equally, this means is that individuals do not have to be 'white people' to actively 
reinforce and act in the interests of whiteness.  
 
Building on the distinction between white people and whiteness, Preston and 
Chadderton (2012: 92) move to think about this in terms of white positionality but 
register that this is also informed by intersectionalities across social class, gender, 
sexuality and ability/disability. Thus, ‘temporary ambiguities’ may occur where white 
people are positioned on the margins of whiteness.  If this is so, the critical focus on 
whiteness in CRT is not an assault on white people but on the socially constructed 
and constantly reinforced power of white identifications and interests (Gillborn 2005, 
488). Furthermore, Preston and Chadderton (2012: 92) condense extensive inquiry 
into the distinction between whiteness and white people through arguing that the 
many and various ways in which the white working classes, white immigrants and 
white women have been positioned on the fringes of white respectability are key 
examples where these groups are given a liminal position within whiteness (see also 
Nayak, 2011).  How and in what ways therefore does this characterisation of 
whiteness informed by CRT help shed light on security approaches in Britain? 
 
 
Codifying Whiteness in Fundamental British Values 
 
One of the key sites for the application and development of CRT in the UK 
context has been within education (see Gillborn 2009; Rollock 2012; Chakrabarty 
2012; Breen 2018; Bhopal & Rhamie 2014). The ways in which CRT has been applied 
to education within the UK are well documented elsewhere, and so this article does 
not replicate that work. The work of Gillborn in particular has drawn attention to the 
outcomes of policies designed and implemented by white power holders (Gillborn 
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2005). These strategies are premised on the notion of maintaining inequalities at the 
biting point of tolerable discomfort for marginalised raclialised communities (Breen 
2018: 51). Such policies operate under a veil of ‘tacit intentionality’ whereby policies 
which have a proven record of producing detrimental outcomes for racial minorities 
are advocated even in the light of evidence that they foster racial inequalities. For 
example, high-stakes testing, school performance tables and selection by ‘ability’ 
have remained within the British educational system for sustained periods of time in 
spite of the fact that research indicates that these policies have detrimental outcomes 
for black students (Gillborn 2005).  
Work in recent years has started to apply CRT across minority ethnic groups 
in Britain, with emergent scholarly work on Muslim communities gaining momentum 
(see Housee 2012; Breen 2016; 2018). These developments raise new challenges 
around the scope of CRT, some of which are discussed throughout the remainder 
of this article. It is also important to emphasise that the enquiry here goes beyond 
education policy, yet this remains one of the key sites where intersections of 
stakeholdership in national identity for British Muslims, and strategies for 
securitisation have become increasingly central. Take for example the UK 
Government’s commitment to Fundamental British Values (DfE 2015). Clearly, issues 
here around ‘values’ and national identity are complex, not only in their relation to 
each other, but also in terms of the implicit parameters for stakeholdership in 
national identification. Applying CRT to explore the implications of FBV for British 
Muslims therefore requires an analytically sensitive approach. The first way to 
address this is to think about whiteness as a series of racialized cultural codes rather 
than phenotype, and specifically how these codes are bound up with particularistic 
sets of public policy norms. In our reading this represents one such cluster of codes 
whose primary function is to reaffirm qualities of Britishness and national identity, 
but in a way that has specific implications for what FBV means in particular for British 
Muslims.  
 
To step back, FBV and its manifestation in schools provides an interesting case within 
which the relationship between religiousity and perceived risks of extremism can be 
explored. Furthermore, the development of FBV and the duty to promote them 
within schools reveals the differential ways in which the broadly Christian heritage of 
the wider white population has been positioned within its framework, compared with 
how FBV impacts on Muslims in schools. FBV is an emergent phenomenon which 
has been most substantively manifested in the Department for Education’s (DfE) 
Promoting fundamental British values as part of ‘Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural’ 
development (SMSC) in schools (DfE 2014). FBV actually first appears in political 
discourse in 2011 within the definition of ‘extremism’ outlined in the Government’s 
counter-terrorism Prevent strategy: 
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Extremism is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, 
including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and 
tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of 
extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this 
country or overseas (Prevent 2011: 107).  
 
This definition of FBV would be referred to later in the 2011 Teacher’s standards, 
which identified that upholding the standards included ‘not undermining the 
fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law individual liberty 
and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (DfE 2011: 14). In 
June 2014 it was stated that then education secretary Michael Gove had announced 
that all schools would be required to promote FBV (Wintour, 2014), with the 
publication of statutory guidance through SMSC following in November 2014 (DfE 
2014). The implicit connection between FBV, SMSC and Prevent was a narrative 
about the security dangers posed by ‘Islamic radicalism’, and which became 
solidified in the revised Prevent duty guidance (2015) that explicitly used FBV within 
the definition of extremism.  
 
The relationship between Prevent and FBV assumes that the values identified as 
British are self-evidently inherent, uncontested and forged against the threat of 
prevalent Islam in the public square.  There are several problems with this, not least 
that part of FBV advocates for ‘religious tolerance’ (DfE 2011: 14). Yet FBV is clearly 
rooted in Prevent and fears around ‘Islamic radicalism’ (Prevent 2015). These fears 
are based on notions of increasing Islam in the public sphere as threat (see Breen 
2018: 55), and arguably represent a clear example of religious intolerance. Aside 
from this contradiction, there is another problem here in the (re)establishment of 
particular values as being fundamentally British through FBV which would have 
previously been presented as shared values as part of engagement with SMSC. This 
affirmation of majoritarian cultural markers has thus become a default measure for 
identifying, by way of contrast, a definition of extremism. It is an approach that 
invariably cements the purpose of FBV as a strategy to police Muslim mobilisations 
and claims-making, perhaps most obviously apparent in the field of education. For 
example, the identification of SMSC as the primary mechanism within which the 
promotion of FBV has strategic and far-reaching implications, as the statutory duty 
to promote Fundamental British Values applies to both independent and maintained 
schools. In particular, the most recently Revised Prevent duty guidance for England 
and Wales (2015) states that:  
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Independent schools set their own curriculum but must comply with the 
Independent School Standards, which include a specific requirement to 
promote Fundamental British Values as part of broader requirements relating 
to the quality of education and to promoting the spiritual, moral, cultural and 
cultural development of pupils. These standards also apply to academies 
(other than 16-19 academies), including free schools, as they are independent 
schools (DfE 2015: 10). 
  
There are likely interesting reasons as to why the requirement to promote FBV 
extends beyond state-funded schools. Whilst there are numbers of Muslim schools 
in the state sector, these numbers are relatively low at 21, compared with 158 in the 
independent sector (Breen 2016: 11). Thus, for FBV to be effective in policing both 
values promoted in state schools with high proportions of Muslim pupils and Muslim 
faith schools, it has to be applicable across both independent and state sectors. This 
ensures a totality of duty to promote FBV as a strategy for policing not only all 
Muslims in state schools in England and Wales, but is also Muslim schools in the 
independent sector. 
 
 
Trojan Horse and responses: FBV and Muslims in schools 
 
It was perhaps no coincidence that the statutory duty to promote FBV followed 
concerns raised by the delivery of the anonymous ‘Trojan Horse letter’ to 
Birmingham City Council in November 2013 (Kershaw 2014: 3). The letter famously 
made claims about an alleged plot by some Muslim groups to install governors at 
schools in an ‘Islamic takeover plot’ (Mackie 2014). Whilst a series of investigations 
have followed, findings appear to be less than clear cut, with the Kershaw enquiry 
ruling that there was ‘no clear and concerted plot’, but that unorthodox methods 
may have been used by some stakeholders. In stark contrast, in July 2014 the newly 
appointed Secretary of State for Education, Nicky Morgan, addressed the House of 
Commons with the findings of Peter Clarke’s inquiry (Clarke 2014) which indicated 
evidence of an ‘aggressive Islamist agenda’ (Coughlan 2014). Within this context it is 
pertinent to identify that Clarke had previously been Head of Counter Terrorism at 
the Metropolitan Police, and was appointed as Education Commissioner despite a 
lack of experience in the education sector itself. Clearly, with contradicting narratives 
emerging around the Trojan Horse letter, it is difficult to establish a clear 
understanding of how far the concerns raised were realised.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the letter, then Education secretary Michael 
Gove instructed the schools in Birmingham with a majority Muslim cohort to be 
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inspected (Miah 2017: 87), even though only six schools were named in the Trojan 
Horse letter (Clarke 2014: 107). Yet, a series of OFSTED inspections followed in a 
total of 21 schools which had a majority intake of Muslim pupils (Miah 2017: 89). The 
subsequent emphasis on FBV within Prevent was introduced with the ‘Common 
Inspection Framework’ (Ofsted 2015) from September 2015 (Miah 2017: 101). 
Interestingly, the 21 inspections of schools in Birmingham appear to focus on section 
10 of the Prevent strategy rather than the criteria present in Ofsted inspection 
guidelines in use at the time which had no key focus on preventing violent extremism 
(Miah 2017: 101), The implications of the above can be more concretely explored 
when looking at the role of OFSTED in the framing and reframing of activities 
documented in the schools inspected following Trojan Horse. For example, Oldknow 
School was inspected in January 2013 and rated ‘outstanding’ overall, and in relation 
to each of the four main criteria which include ‘behaviour and safety of pupils’ and 
‘leadership and management’ (OFSTED 2013). Many areas of provision were praised, 
including an international school trip to Saudi Arabia, which was reported as a ‘life 
changing experience’ for pupils who had taken part (OFSTED 2013: 6). Furthermore, 
the school was also praised for using its funding to subsidise ‘uniforms, trips and 
even large scale trips, such as the ones to Saudi Arabia, to ensure that any pupil is 
able to participate’ (OFSTED 2013: 7).  
 
Following the naming of the school in relation to Trojan Horse, the school was 
inspected again in April 2014. This time the school was rated overall as ‘inadequate’, 
with ‘behaviour and safety of pupils’ and ‘leadership and management’ also rated as 
‘inadequate’ (OFSTED report 2014a). The change in rating, in and of itself, raises 
question as to the extent to which OFSTED exercised consistency in two reports less 
than eighteen months apart. However, the most striking revision was manifested in 
concerns around the previously highly praised trip to Saudi Arabia. In particular, the 
use of funding to subsidise the trip was questioned on the grounds that this had 
been used for Muslim pupils, and that the ‘choice of destination meant that pupils 
from other faiths were not able to join the trip’ (OFSTED 2014a: 7).  
 
More worryingly, narratives around the Park View School raise further concerns 
about the consistency with which OFSTED have approached inspections following 
Trojan Horse. The school received a rating of outstanding in 2012, with the former 
Chief Inspector of Schools, Sir Michael Willshaw, praising the school's extraordinary 
exam success despite having 60% of its pupils qualifying for free school meals 
(Adams 2014a). Following the identification of Park View school, along with two 
other schools in the Park View Academy Trust, the OFSTED report for 2014 rated 
the school as inadequate. Whilst pupil attainment and quality of teaching were rated 
'good', concerns were raised about the 'behaviour and safety of pupils' and 
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'leadership and management' which were both rated as 'inadequate' (OFSTED 
2014b). However, a leaked report based on an inspection conducted on the 5th and 
6th of March 2014, widely circulated within the government, made a series of 
relatively minor recommendations which included improving systems for 
safeguarding and strategies to ensure students are safe from extremism (Adams 
2014a). This initial report would have lowered the overall rating to 'requires 
improvement', but under OFSTED rules the school would have retained its 
'outstanding' rating due to its success in other areas (Adams 2014a). However, 
OFSTED inspectors returned to the school unannounced on the 17th of March 2014 
to conduct a second inspection which ruled the school to be 'inadequate'. The 
implications of this rating were that the school would be placed into 'special 
measures', stripped of its governors and managing trust, and handed over to new 
and approved management (Adams 2014a). This would come a little more than two 
years after Ofsted inspectors rated the school as outstanding in all areas and praised 
it for its excellent academic results and inclusivity (Adams 2014b)  
 
The confusion around the consistency of OFSTED procedures around Park View 
school was met with concern by both the Park View Educational Trust (PVET) and 
assistant principal at the time Lee Donaghy. Writing for the Guardian newspaper in 
June 2014, Donaghy argued that a strongly held belief among staff was 'that the 
inspectors were ordered back into the school by somebody who felt that Park View 
had to be placed in special measures to enable the removal of Park View Educational 
Trust' (Donaghy, 2014). Indeed, the initial leaked inspection report would have 
allowed the school to retain its governors and managing trust, but the second report 
ensured the removal of the Park View Educational Trust (PVET). The trust argued 
that there was a feeling of OFSTED ‘working to a timeline and in a climate of 
suspicion, driven by the Trojan Horse letter and coupled with unproven allegations 
about Park View that had started to appear in the media’ (PVET 2014). Park View 
school was subsequently renamed the 'Rockwood Academy', and is now sponsored 
by the CORE educational trust. Interestingly, along with Park View school, the Nansen 
primary school and Golden Hillock were also placed into special measures following 
their OSTED respective inspections in April 2014. All three were operated by the 
PVET, and the rating of these schools as 'inadequate' also allowed the Department 
for Education to remove the trust from the running of those schools and replace 
their governors (Adams 2014b). Nansen primary school is now affiliated with the 
CORE educational trust which replaced the PVET as sponsors at Park View school. In 
response, Sir Tim Brighouse, a former chief education officer in Birmingham, along 
with 20 co-signatories, expressed serious concern around the consistency of 
inspection procedures following Trojan Horse. In a letter to The Guardian in 2014 
Brighouse et al stated: 
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It is beyond belief that schools which were judged less than a year ago to be 
outstanding are now widely reported as 'inadequate', despite having the 
same curriculum, the same students, the same leadership team and the same 
governing body. This is uncharted territory, with Ofsted being guided by an 
ideology at odds with the traditional British values which schools are meant 
to espouse, particularly fairness, justice and respect for others (Brighouse et 
al cited in Adams 2014c). 
 
The removal of the PVET as sponsors at Park View school, the Nansen primary school 
and Golden Hillock was met with a statement from the organisation which contested 
many of the grounds on which its schools had been rated as ‘inadequate’. The PVET 
emphasised that ‘the Ofsted reports find absolutely no evidence of extremism or an 
imposition of strict Islamic practices in our schools’ (PVET 2014). Further to this, the 
Trust argued that ‘the idea of a Trojan Horse plot has created a perfect storm for 
individuals and organisations with agendas around education, immigration, faith, 
securitisation and straightforward party politics’ (PVET 2014).  
 
Some of the wider problems around the way that Trojan Horse was handled 
are inherently related with contested ideas of what constitutes appropriate religious 
influence. All schools (whether denominational or not) are duty bound to provide 
Religious Education (RE) and collective worship (DFE 1994). The designation of RE 
and collective worship is subject to the local authority Standard Advisory Councils 
for Religious Education (SACREs). For non-denominational schools, RE and collective 
worship should be of a ‘broadly Christian character’ (DFE 1994). However, the SACRE 
for Birmingham had developed a multi-faith approach since 2007, which promoted 
RE in line with a multiplicity of religions given the diversity of the city (Birmingham 
City Council 2007). It was broadly ignored in the handling of the Trojan Horse case, 
that the schools named in the Trojan Horse letter were adhering to locally agreed 
RE syllabi and provision for Islamic collective worship. However, the Clarke report 
identifies that the focus of the investigation was on a small number of schools which 
had ‘converted to academy status in recent years’ (Clarke 2014: 7) At no point in the 
Kershaw or Clarke reports is it emphasised that the schools involved were adhering 
to all legislative requirements and arrangements previously in place– criteria on 
which they had been previously praised. There are two main problems here. The first 
is that what is locally upheld as good practice in multi-faith provision is overlooked 
by the DFE. The second, is that the lack of acknowledgement of the commitment to 
multi-faith principles in the local SACRE itself allows for a dramatic distortion of the 
accusations around the extent to which appropriate religious influence may have 
been exceeded. If we return to the wider concerns expressed around FBV and SMSC 
11 
 
above, Trojan Horse represents an interesting case which draws attention to the 
privileging of white interests through explicitly demarcating appropriate Islamic 
influence from appropriate religious influence more generally. 
 
 
In addition to the inconsistencies around Ofsted inspections inconsistencies were 
also found across a series of Hearings conducted by the National College for 
Teaching and Leadership (NCTL) investigating individual teachers following Trojan 
Horse. The furore around these investigations mirrored a broader moral panic where 
it was reported in the media that the NCTL were looking into around 30 teachers 
with a total number of 100 being possibly targeted (Holmwood & O’Toole 2017: 
199). In reality, cases were actually brought against 12 individuals through a series 
of 4 Hearings by the NCTL (ibid.). A series of problems ensued, including concerns 
that witness statements which had been given to the Clarke report had been 
significantly longer and contained evidence which was favourable to the defence, 
but which had been omitted from both the report and statements elicited by the 
NCTL (Holmwood & O’Toole 2017: 201). Procedural irregularities continued, with 
Hearing 2 being quashed under a High Court appeal, in part due to failure to disclose 
evidence which was presented in Hearing 1 (Holmwood & O’Toole 2017: 200). The 
collapse of Hearing 1 followed on the grounds of irregularities which represented an 
‘abuse of the process which is of such seriousness that it offends the Panel’s sense 
of justice and propriety’ (Holmwood & O’Toole 2017: 202). This marked the end of 
the NCTL investigations, with only 1 teacher sanctioned with a 5 year ban, and the 
reasons given for the Panel to discontinue the main hearing make up 28 pages of 
text, alongside a Note submitted by the NCTL which acknowledged that the defence 
lawyers had been ‘deliberately misled’ (ibid). These examples demonstrate the ways 
in which Muslims have been differentially targeted through various different 
mechanisms of state apparatus around securitisation. But they also demonstrate that 
Muslims have been afforded differential access to due process through formal 
channels which have consistently facilitated strategic efforts to manipulate outcomes 
in the wake of Trojan Horse. 
 
 
FBV and Interest Convergence 
 
What the discussion thus far helps make apparent are the ways that strategies 
of securitisation have implications for the marginalisation of Muslim groups in Britain.  
If this process occurs at primarily the macro level, where such strategies are bound 
up with national protection, then a question remains around the interests of British 
Muslims within this dynamic. Specifically, the extent to which British Muslims figure 
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as stakeholders in this process is missing, and assume indifference towards the 
interests of Muslims as requiring security too. Whilst the interests of British Muslims 
may well be entirely convergent with those of white English groups, the framing of 
approaches to securitisation arguably ignores this convergence. This process 
inevitably raises questions about the neutrality behind strategies for securitisation. 
 
Derek Bell (1980) once argued that advances in US civil rights were concessions that 
aligned not with the objectives of civil rights, but with US propaganda efforts with 
the Soviet Union. It was an assertion empirically explored by Dudziack (2001) who 
pointed to newly available records of how the Supreme Court considered the cold 
war implications of their rulings in favour of civil rights cases. For CRT scholars, these 
concessions also came with a wider set of implicit demands, as Delgado (2003:129) 
put it, that ‘African Americans and other people of colour…embrace anti-
communism, fight in foreign wars, and purge themselves of radical elements’.  For 
Bell, Delgado, Dudziack and others, the interests of minority ethnic groups were 
advocated or advanced only in so far as they converged with the interests that 
brought gains for white groups. What is overlooked here is that interest convergence 
should be read solely in terms of conventional social policy, but also as a means of 
supporting discursive facets of systems of injustice. 
 
The UK has seen a great deal of new policy and practice informed by a concern with 
Muslim radicalism. Currently, the Prevent Duty requires frontline personnel to be 
vigilant for signs of increased religiosity, as though this were a reliable indicator of 
tendencies toward violence. As O’Toole (2015) summaries, public sector workers are 
being asked to interpret signs of radicalisation, based on a weak and contested 
understanding of radicalisation. One of the keys ways that this has been manifested 
is through recent revisions to Prevent. In 2011, the Prevent strategy was expressly 
revised to target “non-violent extremism” on the theory that it is the precursor to 
terrorist activity (OSJI 2016: 33). Furthermore, the Revised Prevent Duty Guidance 
requires specified authorities, which includes schools, to prevent individuals from 
being drawn into both non-violent and violent extremism (for a full list of ‘specified 
authorities’ see Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, 2015). It has 
been argued that the focus on ‘pre-criminality’, non-violent ‘extremism’, and 
opposition to ‘British values’ is fundamentally flawed (OSJI 2016: 34) for a series of 
reasons but two are most relevant here. Firstly, the success of the strategy is 
predicated on the assumption that its use can effectively determine whether an 
individual will commit a terrorist act in the future (ibid). Secondly, and related closely 
to this, the duty to report on ‘pre-criminality’ gives legal backing to potentially 
discriminatory determinations of ‘extremism’ by frontline professionals.    
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These concerns have indeed played out, with a significant number of children and 
young people being referred to the Government’s de-radicalisation ‘Channel’ 
programme. For example, in 2015/16 56% of referrals were for individuals under 20, 
with the education sector making the most referrals (2,539) accounting for 33% of 
all referrals that year (Home Office 2017: 4). 65% (4,997) were referred for concerns 
related to Islamist extremism with 36% of those referred in 2015/16 (2,766) leaving 
the process requiring no further action. 3,793 (50%) were signposted to alternative 
services and 1,072 (14%) were deemed suitable, through preliminary assessment, to 
be discussed at a Channel panel (Home Office 2017: 4). The vast majority (76%) of 
those discussed at a Channel panel were regarding Islamic extremism. For 2015/16 
381 individuals received channel support following a channel panel with 96% of 
these (365) subsequently leaving the process and 4% (16 individuals) receiving 
continued support (Home Office 2017: 4). Of those who left the process, 83% were 
identified as having their risk of being drawn into terrorism being ‘significantly 
reduced’ (Home Office 2017: 4). These figures could be taken to indicate that this 
process successfully rehabilitates individuals who would have otherwise committed 
terrible acts. But they could  also be taken to demonstrate just how widely the net is 
cast when using tentative notions of ‘pre-criminal’ behaviour, and just how vague 
the criteria for referral is, given that only 4% of those who received support following 
a Channel panel required ongoing support. For 2015/16, only 16 individuals required 
ongoing support out of a total of 7631. Expressed as a percentage this amounts to 
0.2% of all referrals, a statistic which might as easily be explained by a lack of 
rationale for 99.8% of referrals as by potential risk of committing a crime.  
 
A number of case studies around referrals to the Channel programme give reason 
for concern. For example, in one instance a mother was called in to a nursery to 
discuss a picture their child had drawn of its father cutting a cucumber. When asked 
what the picture was of, the child was misinterpreted as saying ‘cooker bomb’ when 
attempting to say ‘cucumber’ (OSJI 2016: 72). The child’s mother was then 
repeatedly told by the nursery manager that she had been referred to Channel, and 
that there was no opportunity to discuss and resolve the matter in-house adding 
‘you can prove yourself innocent. They might not take your kids off you’ (OSJI 2016: 
72). After refusing to sign the form and seeking legal advice, it transpired that she 
had not in fact been referred, but the process left her feeling ‘like an outsider’, and 
targeted as a result of being Muslim (OSJI 2016: 73). 
 
In another case a Muslim kitchen staff member in one school drew attention to other 
kitchen staff neglecting the designation of utensils for serving halal food. This 
resulted in accusations from other kitchen staff that their Muslim colleague had said 
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that she ‘supported ISIS’ and she was subjected to a disciplinary panel and 
subsequent appeals panel with the school and the Local Authority. Whilst the 
accused member of staff won the decision at the appeals panel and was reinstated, 
she was still issued with a ‘first warning’ and had not returned to work in the five 
months following this (OSJI 2016: 68). This brings us back the discursive positioning 
of British Muslims as stakeholders within strategies for securitisation. How do their 
interests figure and to what extent are they afforded legitimacy?  
 
In the aftermath of the attack in Manchester on the 22nd of May 2017, various media 
sources drew attention to emergent accounts of Muslims contacting authorities over 
a period of time about radicalisation in Manchester. Mohammed Shafiq, Chief 
Executive of the Manchester-based ‘Ramadhan Foundation’, spoke specifically about 
anxieties members of the Muslim community had raised about Salman Abedi: 
‘people in the community expressed concerns about the way this man was behaving 
and reported it in the right way using the right channels’, but ‘did not hear anything 
since’ (Mendick et al 2017). Friends of Abedi also allegedly became so worried about 
his behaviour that they individually called the counter-terrorism hotline five years 
ago and again last year; they had been concerned that ‘he was supporting terrorism’ 
and had expressed the view that ‘being a suicide bomber was ok’ (Mendick et al 
2014). A member of the close-knit Libyan community in South Manchester also 
stated that Abedi had been banned from Didsbury Mosque after confronting an 
Imam who was delivering an anti-extremism sermon (Mendick et al 2014). The 
Mosque reported Abedi to the authorities and he had subsequently been placed on 
a ‘watch list’ because of his extremist views (Mendick et al 2014).  
 
Muslim community engagement with counter-terror processes and procedures 
represents an example of interest convergence as British Muslims had clearly 
exercised serious concern as stakeholders in national security. Counter to the subtext 
of strategies like FBV, this represents an example of increased Islamic influence 
actually informing action around maintaining convergent interests around the 
protection of the public from violent extremism. There is evidence to suggest that 
Muslims were concerned about Abedi over a period of at least five years. 
Furthermore, the 2017 special report by the Intelligence and Security Committee of 
Parliament identified a range of areas where MI5 and counter-terrorism police could 
have taken more action (see ISC 2017). The question to ask at this point is whether 
or not more substantive action would have been taken had the voices informing 
concern been those of white, non-Muslim citizens.  
 
The examples of innocent Muslims caught up in the Prevent strategy would suggest 
that this would likely have been the case, and clearly requires further and substantive 
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empirical research. However, the framing of securitisation as a manifestation of 
ostensively white majority interests raises questions about the impact of racialisation 
on the legitimacy of voices in discourses around securitisation. Not only is 
securitisation principally associated with protection from Muslims, but in spite of 
active engagement, it still seems that concerns raised by Muslims have not been 
treated with urgency and legitimacy. Paying attention to the discursive features 
overlooked by CRT leads us to understand the positioning of Muslim voices as 
peripheral to those of 'real' stakeholders in securitisation. This example clearly 
demonstrates the intersection of interests around securitisation across white majority 
and Muslim minority groups. The intersection of these interests reveal differential 
expectations for Muslim and white English groups around the purpose of 
securitisation. Whilst public policy discourses around securitisation are firmly rooted 
in notions of protection for citizens, the wider expectations for Muslims in 
securitisation appears to be less about being protected and more about being active 
in engaging with counter-terror processes. This demonstrates a privileging of 
perceptions of security among white citizens at the expense of full stakeholdership 
in protection for Muslims.  
 
 
Conclusion: Securing Whiteness 
 
In a typically perceptive discussion of trajectories in the scholarship of 
whiteness studies, Garner (2017: 1585) argued that ‘the sword Damocles hanging 
over the scholar of whiteness is the question of how to wrestle its meanings into 
connection with other social relationships…and remaining true to the first wave 
origin: make white supremacy visible’ (original emphases). This article is subject to 
these dynamics too, in so far as it has aimed to explore the ways in which 
reinvigorations of whiteness sit at an interplay between strategies around 
securitisation and what this means for Muslims in Britain. We have argued that the 
relationship between FBV and definitions of 'extremism' in the Prevent strategy has 
had profound implications for the monitoring and regulating of Muslim mobilisations 
in Britain.  
 
The literature on Critical Race Studies allows us to see how FBV represents a 
majoritarian set of cultural markers, which assume a self-evident and inherent nature, 
uncontested and forged against the threat of prevalent Islam in the public square. 
For Muslims, misalignment with these markers has specific implications and specific 
risks are faced which do not apply to other Britons, most notably that of being 
associated with, affiliated with, or suspected of 'extremism'.   In particular, one of the 
contributions made in this article has been to explore how the statutory duty to 
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promote FBV manifests a particular approach for regulating Muslims in educational 
settings. The Trojan Horse hoax represents the starkest example of this, and further 
cemented public anxieties toward Muslims in the wider public consciousness. Further 
to this, the series of events around Trojan horse and the subsequent OFSTED 
inspections and reports discussed in this article demonstrate that anxieties around 
extremism exist on two levels - anxieties around extremism itself; and anxieties within 
regulatory authorities around being seen to have 'missed' a possible cause for 
concern relative for Prevent, SMSC or FBV. The case of Park View School and 
apparent inconsistencies in a series of OFSTED reports and inspections at the school 
seems to embody this process most substantively among the observations 
presented in this article. 
 
Then, there is the question of what all of the above means for Muslims in Britain and 
their stakeholdership in national security. A series of processes have led us to argue 
here that securitisation, as it has played out in the British context, has an innate 
relationship with whiteness and resurgences in nationalist discourse in the English 
public space in particular. It goes without saying that there is clearly a need for 
further research in this area, but the theoretical considerations and empirical 
observations discussed in this article reveal how a complex interplay of public 
discourse, state strategy and implementation suggest that securitisation is about 
'securing whiteness' in a series of ways.  
 
Whilst the surface narrative suggests an impartial strategy for preventing violent 
extremism, our reading of how this is playing out reveals a far subtler and discursive 
effort to delineate 'British' and Muslim which has consequences for the latter. FBV is 
a set codes whose primary function is to reaffirm qualities of Britishness and national 
identity in a way that has specific implications for British Muslims. There is 
undoubtedly an implicit narrative around the threat of 'Islamic radicalism' that 
connects FBV, SMSC and Prevent. These efforts to reify Britishness have heralded a 
dynamic in which the reification of Britishness occurs where the interests of British 
Muslims as stakeholders in both nation and national security are diminished. The 
danger here is that the outcomes of these strategies could sustain a focus on issues 
around the fringes of radicalisation, rather than allowing a meaningful exploration 
for how the dynamics of these related strategies might contribute to feeling of 
alienation for Muslims as stakeholders in securitisation themselves.  
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